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BEYOND THE DROPZONE

Shooting on the Syrian/Lebanese Border

Posted by editor on 30 July 2008 at 4:09 pm UTC

A number of armed clashes have been reported (between Sunni Muslims and Alawites, a Shiia sect allied with Shiia Hezbollah) in-and-around Tripoli since Friday, but “all is [temporarily] quiet on the northern front.” Not so in the east where today the Associated Press is reporting:

“Gunmen attacked a Lebanese military post near the Syrian border at dawn Wednesday, killing a soldier and wounding another, a security official said. …

“The post is one of several set up by the Lebanese army on the border with Syria two years ago after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. They are designed to curb the smuggling of arms and contraband goods.

“The attack came two days after a military court began the trial of the leader of an al-Qaida-inspired group and more than 30 other extremists who battled Lebanese troops in a Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon last year.

“Shaker Youssef al-Absi, the head of the Fatah Islam group, is being tried in absentia.”

Not surprising. But for perspective — having spent much time along the remote, porous, and marginally defined Syrian/Lebanese border in the fall of 2007 – I can say unequivocally that most of the border is not properly defended. Smuggling is rampant and unchecked: Arms, ammunition, and cash (U.S. dollars) are regularly trucked or simply walked across the border from Syria into Lebanon.  And the weapons and money are bound for un-policed Hezbollah-controlled zones inside Lebanon. We’ve gleaned much intelligence on this over the past nine-plus months (Hezbollah sympathizers and apologists may deny this. The counterterrorism experts will confirm it.).

The smuggling is impossible to control. Again, the border is isolated and marginally defined, so small Syrian Army outposts are positioned on Lebanese territory.

While in Lebanon, my security detail and I literally drove out to one of these posts near the village of Al Qaa, and I subsequently filed two reports at NRO based on what I witnessed, learned from my diverse and unconnected group of sources, and gathered from open sources.

REPORT 1 (Oct. 12): I previously had doubts, or perhaps I believed it to be a miscalculation. But now I am seeing it with my own eyes: Syrian troops here are manning positions inside Lebanese territory. And they’re flying the Syrian colors on top of those positions.

This is in clear violation of at least two UN Security Council Resolutions that I can pull off the top of my head (1559 and 1701): There may be more.

I spent most of today tooling around the fringes of the border in a battered old Range Rover with my security man, Henry, and a couple of trusted, armed, former combat-soldiers in the Lebanese Army who, not only took me to the Syrian outposts; but drove me to the smuggling lines where large containers of weapons – rifles, rockets, stinger missiles, you name it — are regularly crossing the border. One of the men tells me he knows for a fact a huge shipment of weapons has passed through here over the past few weeks. Frankly looking at this place, I can’t imagine they wouldn’t be. This is simply too easy.

Smuggling of people, arms, etc. here is constant. This was confirmed by one of the many shepherds we’ve seen here today [and reported through all manner of open sources]. Bedouins and their camps are everywhere, and most of them are Syrian. We drove most of the day, but covered some ground on foot. We spoke to a Syrian soldier at one of the outposts so close I could have physically grabbed him. He was a young man, looked to be about 15 or 16, and appeared a bit nervous. He was wearing sweatpants and a t-shirt because, as he says, his officer, who only checks on him once a month, doesn’t care. And his sergeant is asleep.

We gave the young soldier some candy before leaving.

REPORT 2 (following day): As I mentioned yesterday, this is one of the many hot weapons-smuggling transit points here in Lebanon. Syrian troops are here manning outposts on Lebanese territory. Men and weapons are crossing in huge numbers, and virtually no one is stopping the crossings or demanding that the Syrians return to their side of the frontier. Worse, there are several Hezbollah and Amal cells just a few short miles behind us (and all around us). I saw hundreds of their yellow and green flags (as well as the black flag of Islam) flying in almost every one of these remote villages traveling east in the Bekaa on the way to the border.One huge Hezbollah banner we drove beneath — it was stretched above the road and tied to two poles on either side — read (translated from Arabic):

‘We have proved that surrender does not exist in our dictionary, knowledge, and philosophy.’

As we drove from Al Qaa to the Syrian border – the closest village to the border and just over four miles between the two points — we did not pass a single Lebanese army or police checkpoint. In fact, the closest Lebanese checkpoint I saw was 14 miles away from the border.

What I did see were a lot of Bedouin camps and shepherds with their sheep and goats. And, at the border — and still inside Lebanon — we came upon the first Syrian outpost, one of many I saw, all with Syrian flags fluttering atop.

The first one was a single-room, stone and cement block house in the middle of an arid field. The flag and several radio antennas were sticking straight up from the roof. The defenders inside were a few men led by a sleeping sergeant. The boy soldier who left the outpost building to see who we were did not even carry his weapon. And instead of his asking us who we were, we asked the questions and he answered (see yesterday’s entry). He told us among other things that his water supply was limited. They don’t have enough to wash their uniforms, barely enough to drink or cook with.

This is a scary place: The gun-running smugglers have the upper hand. The Syrians, who are not supposed to be here, are here. I don’t see any Lebanese troops. And Hezbollah is everywhere.

Visit W. Thomas Smith Jr. online at uswriter.com.

GET SOME!

Posted by editor on 27 July 2008 at 10:18 pm UTC

Perhaps one of the coolest recruiting slogans ever -

Iran Likelier to use Nuclear Weapons via Terrorist Groups like Hezbollah and Hamas

Posted by editor on 20 July 2008 at 5:33 pm UTC

Bioterrorism expert Dr. Jill Dekker alerts me to a piece in today’s Jerusalem Post, a portion of which reads:  

“The danger posed by a nuclear-armed Iran is not in that the Islamic Republic may launch an atomic bomb at Israel, but in that it could provide such a weapon to terrorist groups in the region, outgoing Israeli Ambassador to the UN Dan Gillerman was quoted as saying Sunday.

“‘The real fear is not that the Iranians will be crazy enough or stupid enough to launch a missile at Israel, but that they will have no compunction about providing rogue regimes and terror organizations like Hamas and Hizbullah with weapons of mass destruction,’ Gillerman told The New York Times. …”

Read the entire piece, Gillerman: Iran likelier to use nukes via proxies.

  [Dr. Jill Dekker]

UPDATE:
Relationships between Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah are far more intimate than we in the West realize — thus the ease of collaboration between state sponsors of terrorism and terrorist organizations regarding WMD development and access – according to Dr. Dekker in comments yesterday at American Congress for the Truth:

“I absolutely have to agree with Ambassador Gillerman’s statements with specific regard not only to Iran’s nuclear weapons arsenal but with their advance bio-chem programs as well.

“We should not forget that Syria too has made efforts toward acquiring a nuclear capacity and possess an advanced bio-chem weapons program. Unfortunately, very few US diplomats or politicians understand the close relationship between top Hezbollah leaders and Syrian and Iranian Ministries of Defense who run Weapons of Mass Destruction programs.

“They don’t even know the players, which scientists comprise which teams, how they are collaborating on projects in various research centers both in Iran and Syria.

“With the exception of highly limited sections of the US Intelligence Community, most diplomats or foreign service officers would have exceptionally limited access to intelligence on specific scientific teams and their familial relationships with Hezbollah, Hamas, PLO-Fatah members. They don’t understand that many Hezbollah members have family members and tribal associates working within the WMD programs of both states and it’s not some ‘formal’ arrangement. It’s not the type of hierarchal structure we in the West are used to where you must have clearances and sign off on transfers of technology or materials to other sections within the US military complex or to an allied nation. This is not at all how WMD programs and military assets are transferred within the Middle East.

“The relationships are not based on formal military alliances but instead on long-standing tribal relationships that can stretch across geo-political regions so Hezbollah acquiring WMD either nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological materials or technology “know-how” is not pre-determined by signing off on some protocol. This is a scientist meeting with a family member with associations helping a family member with the blessing of the government. It’s far more intimate than the US and allies can imagine. Proxies are not outside the systems they are not existing external to Iran or Syria. They are familial and that makes the designation to provide WMD to Hezbollah far more realistic and immediate than the US or UK could probably imagine with their somewhat limited reference points.

“In the Middle East, transfers from a state weapons lab which would be part of the Ministry of Defense structure to what the West considers a ‘terrorist’ organization like Hezbollah can occur very rapidly. That is because the Syrians and Iranians consider Hezbollah and other ‘terrorist’ groups to be extensions of their formal military. The West tends to create a false barrier -even a semantic one, between Hezbollah and Iran or Syria. This is a fictional barrier as it doesn’t really exist. The US/UK and EU base military weapons deployments on their own standards, which would be highly formal. That simply is not how it works with Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and other proxies. Instead, they may have a cousin who has a cousin who works on Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers or works on Saxotoxins and they will provide it outside a formal structure or what we would think of as a formal military structure. The lines for them are not so cut and dry.”

Visit W. Thomas Smith Jr. online at uswriter.com.

Al-Taqiyya is Alive and Well in Geneva

Posted by editor on 20 July 2008 at 2:06 pm UTC

Our piece, Al-Taqiyya is Alive and Well in Geneva, is the Sunday cover story in this morning’s
CANADA FREE PRESS:

“The so-called “fizzling” of the talks in Geneva between the United States and Iran, Saturday, was not unexpected by any expert estimation. Which makes one wonder why the U.S., the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council (Britain, China, France, and Russia), and Germany were willing to sit down with the Persian state in the first place. … “

Read it here.

“We may not shoot you today as long as you keep giving us what we want”

Posted by editor on 18 July 2008 at 7:12 pm UTC

Israel’s Arutz Sheva reported Monday:

“… Hizbullah is preparing to arm its rockets with chemical warheads and to build extensive fortifications. Defense Minister Ehud Barak blames the Syrians, while Prime Minister Ehud Olmert asks the United Nations to do something. 
 
“’[UN Security Council] Resolution 1701 is being violated. Hizbullah continues to get stronger with the ongoing and intimate assistance of the Syrians,’ according to Defense Minister Barak. Speaking at a meeting of the Labor party’s Knesset representatives on Monday, Barak said, ‘The delicate balance that exists on the northern border should not be violated on the two-year anniversary of the Second Lebanon War. We should make an explicit statement: Resolution 1701 did not work, it is not working, and all indications are that it will not work in the future. It is a failure.’
 
“Adding further weight to Defense Minister Barak’s declaration is an article in the Kuwaiti daily Al-Siyasa, which reported Monday that Hizbullah has acquired chemicals needed to make weapons such as nerve gas or mustard gas from North Korean suppliers. The Lebanese terrorist organization is allegedly preparing to arm its Katyusha rockets with such chemical warheads. Echoing Barak’s claims, the Kuwaiti paper also stated that the assistance of Syria and Iran has been crucial in Hizbullah’s efforts to acquire chemical weapons capabilities. The Al-Siyasa report was based on intelligence provided to the Kuwaiti paper by Syrian opposition figures in the United States. …”

The report continues with a discussion of Hezbollah’s rebuilding and new construction of underground bunkers, the shipping of heavy construction material – and the smuggling of weapons — to Hezbollah-controlled areas in south Lebanon, as well as the failure of UN forces to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which calls for “a buffer zone free of ‘any armed personnel’ — both Hezbollah militants and Israeli troops — between the United Nations-drawn Blue Line in southern Lebanon and the Litani River.”
 
No mention, however, of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which “calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias,” but has never been enforced as evidenced by the armed terrorist-militias — like Hezbollah, Amal, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and other allied militias – who launched or quickly joined the terror-offensive against the Lebanese government and citizenry in May.

As I said in an email to colleagues today, we’ve got to shut Hezbollah down on every front because this group – which is perhaps the world’s largest terrorist army (certainly a proxy arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) — is increasingly trying to work its way into some sort of mainstream acceptance in Lebanon … and in the eyes of the world.

The Lebanese government is granting Hezbollah all sorts of concessions (and getting nothing in return from Hezbollah except a promise that “We may not shoot you today as long as you keep giving us what we want.”). America and the greater West have our heads in the sand. Most Americans are clueless as to what is actually happening or what any of it means. The UN is impotent. And the Lebanese Army and the Interior Security Forces (national police) are simply not strong enough to thwart anything Hezbollah is doing.

Meanwhile, Iran is pouring money and weapons into the program, and the program is extending its reach on nearly every continent in the world.

Read related updates here and here.

Visit W. Thomas Smith Jr. online at uswriter.com.

NOTE: The opinions expressed in these articles are solely those of the author, and do not represent the opinions of World Defense Review and its affiliates. WDR accepts no responsibility whatsoever for the accuracy or inaccuracy of the content of this or any other story published on this website. Copyright and all rights for this story (and all other stories by the author) are held by the author.

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J. Peter Pham, Ph.D. : 'Strategic Interests'
* Ballots and Bullets: The Tale of the Two Somalias
[06 Jul 10]

Walid Phares, Ph.D.
* Iran Global Terrorist Reach
[15 Jul 10]

Abigail R. Esman : 'International Desk'
* Islamophobia
Is the rejection of radical Islam "anti-Muslim"?
[27 Jul 10]

Rabbi Daniel M. Zucker
* The Roots of Washington's Failures in Dealing with "Rogue Regimes"
[01 Apr 10]


W. Thomas Smith Jr.
* 'Beyond the DropZone'
Intelligence and Analysis



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