Published 07 September 05
[Originally published at NavySEALS.com]

U.S. military response to Katrina both timely and proportionate

By Commander Mark Divine
Special to World Defense Review

EDITOR'S NOTE: The following story was written by Mark Divine, but includes the at-length comments of an anonymous U.S. Naval officer who is directly involved in the relief efforts.

With all the finger pointing going on over the "disastrous" disaster relief efforts on the part of the federal government, I thought it would be informative to share an exchange between a well-intentioned sideliner who is critical of the response time of the military to relief efforts in New Orleans, and a U.S. Naval officer.

Not noted is that the federal government can not, legally, send in combat troops unless requested by a State under Posse Comitatus law. The failure in New Orleans did not start with FEMA, but with local, then State officials who showed extremely poor leadership in this unbelievable catastrophe. FEMA, without a doubt, could have initially demonstrated greater professional experience in dealing with a disaster of this magnitude as well, but they quite honestly did not have that experience, and are burdened with the mother of all bureaucracies, the Department of Homeland Security.

I have kept names out of this to protect the identity of our Navy's finest assets – its junior officers.

"I'm gratified to know that these ships [reference to U.S. Navy vessels and helo assets deployed to New Orleans from San Diego] were ready to sail on short notice. My questions are A) was the order to sail given? If so, why did it take so long for the ships to get on station? and B) If the order wasn't given, why not?"

Response from a U.S. Navy active-duty Lieutenant [O-3]:

I can weigh in, personally, on one small piece of the puzzle:

I am an officer at Commander Helicopter Sea Combat Wing Pacific, which is headquartered at Naval Air Station [NAS] North Island in San Diego, California. My unit oversees nine squadrons of H-60 helicopters (the Navy's version of the Army's Blackhawk), two training squadrons, two forward-based squadrons in Japan and Guam, and five San Diego-based deployable squadrons.

One of those squadrons was aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln when it provided life-saving support in Malaysia after the tsunami last year. That squadron's "Grey Angels," as the local people called them, flew thousands of hours and moved tens of thousands of pounds of relief supplies in addition to performing routine rescues of survivors on the ground. As the ship steamed towards the stricken area (prior to receiving any orders from the Pentagon to do so), their carrier strike group commander, a two-star admiral, came over the 1MC (the ship's intercom) and told his 5,000 pilots, maintenance personnel, and sailors that he had one order for them to carry out: "Do good."

Not more than 12 hours after the impact of Hurricane Katrina was broadcast over the news, I was called into a no-notice meeting of all the squadron operations and maintenance officers we could gather at our Wing to organize our efforts and to see what help we could feasibly provide. No one told us to hold this meeting – no staff captain at AIRPAC, no fleet admiral, no senator.

Squadrons dropped everything they were doing – trying to fix broken aircraft, trying to get flight students through a demanding and faced-paced training syllabus, trying to coordinate required training events such as torpedo and missile shoots, trying to get about 300 people packed up and loaded onto ships for regularly scheduled training periods and deployments. They dropped everything to see what they could offer in the way of help.

No one complained. No one asked, "How long will I be away from my family THIS time?" One question that was asked, however, was "Should we bring body armor?" in response to news reports of shots being fired at some of the rescue helicopters that had already arrived (Those helos came from Jacksonville and Pensacola, Florida or Mobile, Alabama). Plans and preparations were made, and we waited for the order to go. Once Vice Admiral [James M.] Zortman, commander of Naval Air Forces, had made his decision to send assets, we sent five aircraft east, joined by other helicopters from the other Wing here at North Island.

It took approximately two days between our initial meeting and when we launched aircraft. Maybe that doesn't sound like a very quick response to someone outside of Naval Aviation. To me it sounds pretty much like we pulled off a miracle.

Consider everything that went into it, just from the perspective of the squadrons sending aircraft: Flight crews had to be selected, based on qualifications and currency. Those crewmembers had to be notified, and they had to pack their flight gear and personal belongings. They had to stop their mail, find dog sitters, notify landlords. (The last time we sent helos for disaster relief after Hurricane Andrew, the crews were there for four months straight.) The crews had to plan the cross-country flight. They had to make reservations for fuel at every airport at which they stopped along the way. They had to make sure they would have material support when they arrived at the Gulf Coast – fuel that could be certified as uncontaminated, food and lodging, a place to park their aircraft. They had to determine to whom they would report, and who had the authority to dictate course rules and operating procedures to minimize the possibility of mid-air collisions between all the rescue aircraft there. They had to organize an airlift on a large cargo plane to carry maintainers (who had to be identified based on qualifications and notified so they could pack) and the extra parts and tools the maintainers need to keep the helicopters flying safely. The personnel selected to go had to turn over jobs and projects at work to those remaining behind, because all the squadrons have other responsibilities and tasks to complete – responsibilities and tasks, I might add, relating to a war we're currently fighting.

And what took Admiral Zortman so long to decide how many and which helicopters to send? Well, probably that war we're currently fighting. The bottom line is, to send helicopters from any Navy unit would impact our ability to send an aircraft carrier to fight that war. Admiral Zortman, like every admiral in the Navy charged with the responsibility of maintaining forces ready to fight a war, needed time to gather information, weigh his options, and decide on priorities. The squadrons who were not tasked with sending helicopters to the Gulf Coast are having to pick up tasking from the squadrons who did.

My job at the Wing is to help keep about 20 flaming batons in the air as we juggle resources and personnel to ensure we always have a "pointy end of the spear" to aim where we need to, in order to ensure the safety and freedom of our country. Hurricane Katrina threw a few more batons into the mix. We'll certainly juggle them, too, but we've got to make sure we don't drop any of the other ones.

And if that is the impact of sending a few helicopters for relief efforts, imagine the impact of sending warships, huge amphibious assault ships, even an aircraft carrier.

There isn't a single asset in the Navy, from the USS Ronald Reagan – the most technologically advanced ship we've got to offer – to the newest seaman recruit who just finished boot camp, which isn't accounted for in the plan of how to keep America safe, which isn't essential to that plan. And when there are new dangers, and new threats, you can bet that the brave men and women of our armed services (as well our military and civilian leadership) will work harder, and longer, and with selfless dedication to meet the new challenges.

But at least allow us a few hours to look before we leap, do to our homework, and to make sure the job we do will be our most effective and efficient effort.

— Commander Mark Divine (USNR) was the Honor Man of BUD/s [Navy] SEAL class 170 and served for eight years on active duty with SEAL Team THREE, SEAL Delivery Team ONE, and Naval Special Warfare Group ONE. He is currently a reserve Naval officer, and has written a report for the U.S. Special Operations Command on the development of a new U.S. Marine Corps special operations detachment. Divine is also the founder of U.S. Tactical, Inc., which operates NavySEALs.com and the SOCOM Store.

Visit Commander Divine on the web at NavySEALs.com.

© 2005 Mark Divine